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BIOLOGICS UNDER A NEW NAFTA: HOW TPP
FIXED NAFTA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY




Scientific developments, such as biologics and personalized medicine, have
created an entirely new category of pharmaceutical drugs that were not consid-
ered when the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) was
adopted in 1994. However, the rise of biologics has increased demand for a
reconfigured NAFTA, particularly with respect to Chapter 17, which outlines
NAFTA’s robust intellectual property standards, as well as Chapter 11, which
both lays out the framework for foreign investment under NAFTA and in-
troduces a controversial mechanism referred to as the investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism (“ISDS”). The intellectual property provisions of the
original NAFTA should be revised to mirror the similar provisions of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) Agreement, which better accommodates
new medical advances. However, despite criticism of their lack of trans-
parency, the investment provisions of the original NAFTA are likely sufficient
to grant medical patent-rights holders the investment protection that they seek
because they strengthen transparency, which is ultimately good for business.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following United States (“U.S.”) President Donald Trump’s May
2017 announcement of his administration’s intent to renegotiate the
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA” or “the Agree-
ment”),1 renewed and increased attention has focused on NAFTA’s
treatment of intellectual property rights and foreign investment.2 This
Note will focus on both of these aspects of NAFTA as they relate to
intellectual property protection for NAFTA signatories. In particular,
this Note will examine the shortcomings of both the intellectual prop-
erty and investment provisions of NAFTA as the two lines of defense
that NAFTA offers companies within the signatory states to protect
their intellectual property abroad.
In 1992, the U.S. adopted the trilateral agreement with Canada and
Mexico called NAFTA.3 Equipped with some remnants of the previ-
ous 1989 bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada,
called the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (“CFTA”)4, NAFTA
sought to progressively eliminate tariffs between the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico; and reduce other duties and restrictions that had previ-
ously prevented the free flow of goods and services across their inter-
national borders.5 Economic in nature, NAFTA’s main objectives
included the “liberalization of trade between [the signatories]”
through “stimulat[ing] economic growth and giv[ing] the NAFTA
countries equal access to each other’s markets.”6 Notably, NAFTA’s
patent protections, including those related to pharmaceutical drugs,
have caused some controversy over the last two decades. Although
this controversy springs from a preexisting debate about the value and
use of patent law in society,7 NAFTA’s protections have further high-
lighted this tension and its effects.
1. USTR: Trump Administration Announces Intent to Renegotiate the North
American Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (May 18, 2017),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-
trump-administration-announces [https://perma.cc/A2QA-HYUM]; North American
Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter NAFTA].
2. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES FOR
THE NAFTA RENEGOTIATION 9 (2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/
Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT6R-LMTS].
3. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFF. U. S. TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-
free-trade-agreement-nafta [https://perma.cc/98HZ-9DJP] (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).
4. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 2001: OPERATION OF THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM  1–9 (2002), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub3510.pdf [https://perma.cc/33Z6-24QX].
5. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), supra note 3.
6. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/trade/nafta-old [https://perma.cc/N3QB-DH3X]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
7. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
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The preexisting debate has two primary camps of thought. From the
perspective of countries like the U.S., pharmaceutical patents are es-
sential to their technology-driven economies.8 Thus, their theory of
patent law creates an incentive to invent while minimizing free-riding,
thereby enabling inventors to continue to develop new products de-
spite the high costs of innovation.9 Providing proof for this theory, a
study titled The Economic Impact of the Patent System found that
“patent protection had a strong influence on the willingness of phar-
maceutical firms to invest in research and development,” likely be-
cause of the high monetary and time-related costs of developing new
drugs.10
By contrast, from the perspective of other countries, including those
that produce fewer medical innovations, the high cost of pharmaceuti-
cal patents from countries such as the U.S. creates a barrier that leads
to a lack of access to new pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, without ef-
fective patent protection, a major issue that companies in the devel-
oped world face from bad actors in the developing world is the piracy
of pharmaceutical patents.11 Additionally, and important to the dis-
cussion in this Note, competition from generic pharmaceutical drug
manufacturers often drives up the cost of producing new medicine,
which potentially stifles new innovation.
The provisions of the original NAFTA that are particularly signifi-
cant to the role of medical patent rights across international borders
are found in Chapter 17, which outlines NAFTA’s robust intellectual
property standards; and Chapter 11, which lays out the framework for
foreign investment under NAFTA and introduces the highly contro-
versial investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (“ISDS”).12 While
controversy over NAFTA’s current medical patent protections prima-
rily resides with conventional pharmaceutical drugs, this controversy
highlights the increasing importance of strengthening the original
NAFTA’s provisions to encompass the unique needs of biologics and
personalized medicine.
Biologics are increasingly being used by medical professionals to
treat patients based on their specific genetic makeup.13 Because bio-
logics are patentable for their process and not their molecular
formula, they are more difficult to replicate in generic form than con-
8. See Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the North
American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation, 8
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 817, 818–19 (1993).
9. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1025–26.
10. Id. at 1032; see C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
THE PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 331–50 (1973).
11. Garcia, supra note 8, at 819.
12. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at 296.
13. See What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG AD-
MIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobac
co/cber/ucm133077.htm [https://perma.cc/5JCW-KDGZ] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
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ventional pharmaceutical drugs and, thus, are more costly to pro-
duce.14 For these reasons, it is imperative that free trade agreements
like the new NAFTA address the current issues with both Chapters 17
and 11. By addressing these issues, NAFTA signatories can preemp-
tively resolve issues that were articulated in cases like Eli Lilly v. Gov-
ernment of Canada, in which the U.S. pharmaceutical company Eli
Lilly sued the Canadian government for invalidating two of the com-
pany’s patents prior to their patent expiration dates, despite Eli Lilly’s
reasonable expectation that its significant investment in the two pat-
ents would be protected against generic manufacturing.15
In Section II, this Note will outline the basics of biologics. This dis-
cussion will focus on how biologics differ from conventional pharma-
ceutical drugs, and how the current U.S. law’s biologics patenting
process slightly differs from the process for patenting conventional
pharmaceutical drugs. Additionally, the introduction to biologics will
include a brief overview of the vast and increasing monetary invest-
ments that pharmaceutical companies are making in this new area of
medicine. Next, this Note will provide an in-depth examination of the
previously mentioned relevant provisions of the original NAFTA, in-
cluding Chapters 17, which focuses on intellectual property; and
Chapter 11, which outlines the treaty’s foreign investment provisions.
The intellectual property and investment provisions will be outlined as
two distinct lines of defense for medical-patent rights holders to pro-
tect their intellectual property under the original NAFTA. Although
this Note will describe how Chapters 17 and 11 relate to conventional
pharmaceutical drugs, the discussion will focus primarily on how these
provisions relate to new forms of medicine such as biologics and per-
sonalized medicine. Finally, this Note will examine proposals to up-
date the original NAFTA to accommodate advancements in medicine,
such as biologics. These proposals will highlight the sick nature of the
intellectual property and investment provisions of the original
NAFTA, as well as effective means of curing them under a new and
reconfigured NAFTA.
II. BIOLOGICS AND PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: THE FUTURE OF
PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE
A. The Basics of Biologics
Unlike conventional pharmaceutical drugs of the past, which gener-
ally have well-defined chemical structures and “can usually be ana-
lyzed to determine all its various components,” biologics are produced
14. How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG.,
https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ [https://perma.cc/
94X2-R5EP] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
15. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, ¶ 5
(Sept. 12, 2013).
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by using recombinant DNA technology of individual patients and are
personalized to the patient’s specific genetic makeup.16 Biologics
come in a wide variety of forms, which include the following: vaccines,
blood and blood components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy,
tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins.17 These unique prod-
ucts are used to treat several conditions, including cancer, rheumatoid
arthritis, psoriasis, and other autoimmune diseases like inflammatory
bowel disease.18
Biologics are typically stronger than conventional pharmaceutical
drugs, and are used when patients require a more escalated therapy,
often due to failure of the first line of treatment.19 Thus, a physician
may be more inclined to prescribe a biologic to help bring a patient
into remission, if the physician suspects that the patient’s treatment
will fail under the weaker pharmaceutical medication.20 Indeed, this
new form of personalized medicine seems to be shifting the direction
of health care “by providing physicians with a more precise tool to
evaluate, diagnose, and treat patients.”21
B. Biologics and the Patenting Process
Because, unlike conventional pharmaceutical products with known
and distinct chemical structures, most biologics come from living mat-
ter and “are complex mixtures that are not easily identified or charac-
terized,”22 patenting these products raises a variety of issues.
First, unlike conventional pharmaceuticals, it is difficult “to charac-
terize a complex biologic by testing methods available in the labora-
tory,” and many of the components of a finished biologic are often
unknown because they are personalized to a specific group of pa-
tients.23 Thus, the patentability of the product lies in the process of
developing it and not in the drug’s molecular formula, as is the case
with most conventional pharmaceutical drugs.24 Additionally, even
when the general process of creating biologics is known, patenting the
process remains difficult because of the variability of the number of
unknown components in the biologic.
Second, the aforementioned difficulty of variability in chemical
formula increases costs in the production of biologics because testing
16. BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., supra note 14.




21. Kristin L. Burge, Personalized Medicine, Genetic Exceptionalism, and the Rule
of Law: An Analysis of the Prevailing Justification for Invalidating BRCA1/2 Patents
in Association of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 501,
505 (2013).
22. FDA, supra note 13.
23. BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., supra note 14.
24. Id.
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the product for effectiveness and safety is only done through clinical
trials.25 Additionally, because the finished product cannot be fully
characterized in the laboratory, manufacturers of biologics “must en-
sure product consistency, quality, and purity by ensuring that the man-
ufacturing process remains substantially the same over time,” which
further adds to the cost of production.26 Critics of gene patents argue
that patent thickets, which are multiple patents on various components
of a gene, potentially increase the cost of researching gene therapy by
stifling “innovations further downstream in the course of research and
product development.”27
Third, there is a rising controversy over whether genetic material
can be patented. In recent years, several U.S. federal court decisions
have “reinvigorated the longstanding debate of whether genes qualify
for patent protection and whether granting such protection does more
harm to patients than good for innovation.”28 The primary argument
against allowing the patenting of these new forms of personalized
medicine is that while such progress comes with “the desire to protect
the intellectual property associated with such advancements,”29 al-
lowing these genetic patents “may substantially impede necessary sci-
entific research and block access to therapeutic treatments” for
individuals who simply cannot afford the high cost of such personal-
ized treatment.30 Those in favor of stronger patent protection of bio-
logics and other forms of personalized medicine suggest that such a
potential setback to genetic innovation would cause more harm to pa-
tients by stifling research initiatives.31
Thus far, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)’s solu-
tion to the third issue is to grant a twelve-year right to data exclusivity
for biologic drugs to supplement the traditional twenty-year patent.32
Data exclusivity pertains to the data that its originator must submit to
regulatory authorities to demonstrate both the safety and efficacy of
its product in order to obtain marketing approval.33 In particular, data
exclusivity “concerns the extent to which a generic competitor, a ‘fol-
lower,’ may rely on the originator’s data in its own application for
25. FDA, supra note 13.
26. BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., supra note 14.
27. Burge, supra note 21, at 512.
28. Id. at 503.
29. Id. at 510.
30. Id. at 511.
31. Id. at 503.
32. Health Policy 101: How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Impact Prescription
Drugs, BROOKINGS INST., https://www.brookings.edu/blog/health360/2015/05/19/heal
th-policy-101-how-the-trans-pacific-partnership-will-impact-prescription-drugs/
[https://perma.cc/UWN3-K84S] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
33. Lisa Diependaele et al., Raising the Barriers to Access to Medicines in the De-
veloping World – The Relentless Push for Data Exclusivity, 17 DEVELOPING WORLD
BIOETHICS 11 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5347964/ [https:/
/perma.cc/D2DN-EDDW] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
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marketing approval.”34 During the twelve-year period of data exclu-
sivity, the FDA may not approve a biosimilar or generic application
that “relies on the data submitted as part of the original biologic appli-
cation.”35 Thus, the producers of biologic drugs are granted a tempo-
rary monopoly; however, this data exclusivity does not prevent
another company from generating the data independently.36
Indeed, despite the aforementioned high cost of clinical trials in
generating biologic data independently, biosimilars of personalized
drugs have appeared on the market in recent years. For example, Cell-
trion produces and sells Inflectra (infliximab-dyyb), a biosimilar to
one of the most common biologics, Remicade (infliximab), sold by
Janssen.37 Generic producers argue that the current “restrictions on
competition keep drug prices unnecessarily high, inevitably putting a
strain on the health system and keeping potentially life-saving drugs
out of reach for many patients.” To counter that point, supporters of
the current data exclusivity measures argue that “given the greater
cost and difficulty of bringing a biologic to market, a longer period of
exclusivity is necessary to incentivize innovation.”38 Either way, if the
twelve-year data exclusivity was shortened, a generic maker could
“petition the FDA for abbreviated clinical trials, . . . saving them mil-
lions of dollars” and “shortening the time needed to get the biosimilar
to the market as a competing product with the original biologic
agent.”39
C. Biologics as a Growing Investment Opportunity
Because of the high costs associated with developing and patenting
biologics (and other forms of personalized medicine), pharmaceutical
companies have a significant incentive to protect not only the finished
patented product but also their investment in the development of
these unique drugs. Indeed, research and development (“R&D”) in
biologics has significantly increased in recent years, likely due to the
similar increase in sales revenue from biologics.
In 2014, the top five biologics companies by sales included the fol-
lowing: (1) Roche, with $30 billion in revenue; (2) Amgen, with $17.6
billion in revenue; (3) Novo Nordisk, with $14.5 billion; (4) AbbVie,
with $13.9 billion; and (5) Sanofi, with $13.9 billion in revenue.40 By
2016, Transparency Market Research (“TMR”) valued the global bio-
34. Id. at 12.
35. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Inflectra, FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/125
544s000lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GDM-W8CB] (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
38. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 32.
39. Michael Fuller, Data Exclusivity, Medications, and the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship, DataInformed, http://data-informed.com/data-exculsivity-medications-and-
trans-pacific-partnership/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
40. Id.
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logic drugs market at $209.8 billion.41 Additionally, TMR forecasts
that the market will enjoy a compound annual growth rate of 10.1%
between 2016 and 2020, reaching $287.2 billion; and 10.9% between
2016 and 2024, reaching $479.8 billion. These estimates are very simi-
lar to those from entities such as BCC research.42 In response to this
growth, individual pharmaceutical companies have increased their in-
vestment in biologics. For example, in June 2017, Sanofi pharmaceuti-
cals announced plans to invest $673 million annually over the next two
to three years in the field of biologics production.43
Not surprisingly, North America remains “the largest single re-
gional market,” with a 44.9% share of the total, and is expected to
grow at a compound annual growth rate of 9.6% from 2016 to 2024.44
TMR submits that while heavy R&D investment has been occurring
in the U.S., these figures are expected to continue to accelerate in the
near future.45 Thus, pharmaceutical companies and biologics produc-
ers have much more at stake than mere data exclusivity. Their invest-
ments in this new form of medicine are equally, if not more, important
to protect both domestically and globally if they are to recoup their
development costs and continue to produce new products, particularly
in the U.S.
III. THE PROBLEM FOR BIOLOGICS UNDER NAFTA
It is hard to imagine that the original NAFTA’s drafters could have
foreseen all of the twenty-first century developments in modern
medicine. Thus, it is not surprising that the growth of biologics and
personalized medicine poses a challenge to the provisions of the origi-
nal Agreement with respect to intellectual property and investment
protection. While its patent protections were innovative, NAFTA’s ro-
bust measures, as written, are insufficient to grant biologics patent
holders the protections that they seek. As regards the investment pro-
tections, the provisions of the original NAFTA are now insufficient to
guarantee patent rights holders that their large investments in bio-
logics will be adequately protected.
41. Nigel Walker, Biologics: Driving Force in Pharma, PHARMA’S ALMANAC,
(June 5, 2017; 12:31 PM), https://www.pharmasalmanac.com/articles/biologics-driving-
force-in-pharma [https://perma.cc/7SMC-XGLH].
42. Id.
43. Matthias Blamont, Sanofi to Invest Further in Biologics, REUTERS, (June 14,
2017; 6:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sanofi-biologics/sanofi-to-invest-
further-in-biologics-idUSKBN1951IV [https://perma.cc/73TY-QPWQ].
44. Walker, supra note 41.
45. Id.
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A. First-Line Protection: Intellectual Property
1. NAFTA Chapter 17
NAFTA’s intellectual property provisions begin in Chapter 17. Ar-
ticle 1701 stipulates that “each Party shall provide in its territory to
[all signatories] adequate and effective protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights,” so long as barriers to legitimate trade are
not created,46 as doing so would defeat the objectives of NAFTA.
Thus, Chapter 17 creates a minimum standard to which all signatories
must adhere.
While Article 1701 establishes the minimum standards for signato-
ries,47 the Agreement also allows contracting countries to create even
higher standards, so long as such protections are extended to other
NAFTA signatories. Article 1702 allows a signatory to “implement in
its domestic law more extensive protection of intellectual property
rights than is required under [NAFTA],” so long as said protection is
not inconsistent with the Agreement;48 and under Article 1703, “each
party shall accord to nationals of another party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the
protection and enforcement of all intellectual property rights.”49
Provisions specific to patent protection are found in Article 1709.
This article makes patents available “for any inventions,” including
both products and processes, “in all fields of technology, provided that
such inventions are new, result from an inventive step, and are capa-
ble of industrial application.”50 Additionally, Article 1709.3 specifi-
cally provides for pharmaceutical patents.51 Among its other
advantages, this provision resolved an existing and “key problem” for
the pharmaceutical industry in the area of “pipeline production,” as
pharmaceutical patents had previously been vulnerable to piracy dur-
ing the testing and development stages of production.52 As a result of
this additional provision, NAFTA ensured that a conventional phar-
maceutical patent that was in the domestic pipeline at the time
NAFTA was enacted could “be protected when introduced in the for-
eign market for the remainder of its patent term.”53
With regard to patent life, Article 1709.12 states that the patent life
between NAFTA signatories runs for either twenty years from when
the patent application was filed or seventeen years after granting the
46. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1701.
47. Garcia, supra note 8, at 830.
48. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1702.
49. Id. art. 1703.
50. Id. art. 1709.
51. Id. art. 1709.3.
52. Garcia, supra note 8, at 831.
53. Id.
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patent rights,54 which was the traditional U.S. standard until the 1995
amendments introduced following the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations and the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).55 For phar-
maceutical patents specifically, five years of protection from generic
competition can be achieved under NAFTA’s five-year exclusivity re-
quirement for product approval test data, which begins after the phar-
maceutical patent is registered.56
Article 1709.10 of NAFTA introduces a provision that allows for
compulsory licensing of patents by the governments of the NAFTA
signatories.57 However, NAFTA only permits such compulsory licens-
ing if “the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder,” except in emergency circumstances.58 Notably,
after Canada significantly changed its compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals in 1993, some pharmaceutical prices in Canada rose
as a result.59 Some experts believe that Article 1709.10 was probably
meant to address the concerns of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
regarding Canada’s use of compulsory licensing prior to the 1993
change in the law.60
2. Shortcomings for Biologics
The introduction of biologics into the market has created some un-
certainty about its treatment under international trade agreements
such as NAFTA, which predates these recent advances in modern
medicine. As a result, while Chapter 17 of NAFTA has advanced in-
ternational patent rights, biologics developers will likely not be able to
secure patent protection like the developers of conventional pharma-
ceutical products.
While certain provisions of NAFTA, such as Article 1709.3, seek to
protect conventional pharmaceutical drugs from piracy and generic
manufacturing in the production pipeline, these same protections are
not afforded to biologics. This is perhaps the most compelling issue for
personalized medicine under a new NAFTA, as the proposition of al-
lowing stronger patent protections for biologics under future free
trade agreements sparks criticism of the current timeline of gene-
based patents. Specifically, critics argue that while a high “level of pat-
ent protection is necessary for incentivizing research,” the patent sys-
tem for these products offers “protection at the wrong stage in the
54. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709.12.
55. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
56. See NAFTA, supra note 1 at 1711.5–.7.
57. Garcia, supra note 8, at 831–32.
58. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709.10(b).
59. See Garcia, supra note 8, at 832.
60. Id.
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development process.”61 In other words, much like the Canadian gov-
ernment’s argument for invalidating U.S. pharmaceutical company Eli
Lilly’s patents for lack of shown utility, some critics argue that the
current patent system grants personalized medicine producers “a
‘hunting license’ . . . rewarding the search without compensating later
discoveries that result in useful application.”62
Additionally, while Article 1709.12 of NAFTA may provide an ad-
ditional five-year exclusivity requirement in addition to the basic
twenty-year patent protection for conventional pharmaceutical
drugs,63 no such provision exists to supplement the data exclusivity
protections for biologics. Most data exclusivity provisions are written
for chemical-based or conventional pharmaceuticals, as new chemical
entities is the keyword in these provisions for data exclusivity. Because
biologics contain mostly biological materials, biologics do not fit
nicely under the definition of new chemical entities. Thus, biologics
are not protected under these provisions. This lack of data exclusivity
protection exacerbates the issue that many pharmaceutical companies
face in recouping the cost of their investments in new medical technol-
ogies. Because the original NAFTA does not specifically grant bio-
logics patent holders an extended data exclusivity provision,
pharmaceutical companies are disadvantaged in the market, poten-
tially stifling innovation.
Despite NAFTA’s lack of special provisions for biologics, biologics
represent the future of medical developments and pose an important
challenge for a new version of NAFTA. Not only is the cost of person-
alized medicine likely higher than the cost of producing conventional
pharmaceutical drugs, but because of the higher costs, there will likely
be a greater demand for generic versions of personalized medical
products such as biologics. Thus, it is imperative that a new NAFTA
contemplate the continuing development of biologics and other forms
of personalized medicine.
B. Second-Line Protection: Investment
1. NAFTA Chapter 11
Although Chapter 17 of NAFTA created robust intellectual prop-
erty protections, Chapter 11 has also generated interest in the world
of intellectual property rights. Specifically, Chapter 11 covers all
things related to foreign investments, with Article 1105 establishing a
minimum standard of treatment for NAFTA investors. This standard
is defined as “treatment in accordance with international law, includ-
ing fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”64
61. Burge, supra note 21, at 512.
62. Id. at 512–13.
63. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709.12.
64. Id. art. 1105.
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Beyond the minimum standards established by Article 1105, Article
1103 grants  NAFTA investors  most-favored-nation treatment “with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.”65
This provision allows investors from a NAFTA signatory to enjoy the
privileges that the other signatories accord one another under similar
circumstances.66
While Chapter 11 covers a wide array of protections and prohibi-
tions, no article has been as innovative or as controversial as Article
1117, which relates to NAFTA’s investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism (“ISDS”). In practice, the ISDS allows private investors to
sue foreign governments without consulting their home govern-
ments.67 Notably, investors may assert claims both as individuals and
on behalf of NAFTA enterprises that they either own or control, both
directly and indirectly.68 Therefore, this mechanism grants an investor
standing to sue a foreign government in circumstances in which the
investor’s only injury is to its investments abroad if the appropriate
ninety-day notice is given to the host country, as outlined in Article
1119.69
According to Article 1120, once the claim is submitted, the investor
chooses between one of the following three arbitration rules: the In-
ternational Center for Settlement of International Disputes (“IC-
SID”) Convention, the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, or the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.70 Article 1123 states that the claim is
heard by a tribunal made up of three panelists, one who is chosen by
the investor and one who is chosen by the state.71 The remaining pan-
elist is chosen by agreement if possible.72 Under Article 1136, an in-
vestor may seek enforcement of a judgment if a NAFTA signatory
government fails to honor it.73
Despite its innovative addition to NAFTA, Chapter 11’s ISDS has
been criticized for a variety of reasons. First, throughout the develop-
ment of bilateral investment treaties, a huge motivator of U.S. support
for the ISDS is the “U.S. government’s desire to afford greater protec-
tion for U.S. investors in developing countries,” which goes against
some beliefs about the role of intellectual property in society.74 In ef-
65. Id. art. 1103.
66. Most Favored Nation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016).
67. See Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829 (2017).
68. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1117.
69. Id. art. 1119.
70. Id. art. 1120.
71. Id. art. 1123.
72. Id.
73. Id. art. 1136.
74. David A. Gantz, Increasing Host State Regulatory Flexibility in Defending In-
vestor-State Disputes: The Evolution of U.S. Approached from NAFTA to TPP, 50
INT’L LAW. 231, 232 (2017).
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fect, the ISDS grants private investors from developed countries, like
the U.S., a second chance to protect their intellectual property related
to conventional pharmaceutical drugs and other medical develop-
ments with arbitration panels under the investment protection provi-
sions in Chapter 11. Thus, the ISDS may grant large multinational
corporations the right to challenge laws that they oppose through ar-
bitration, which tends to be more industry-friendly.75
Second, there is a “renewed and growing concern about the shift of
intellectual property norm-setting activities from the trade regime to
the investment regime.”76 One key issue with this shift is its potential
to “eliminate the traditional limitations, safeguards, and flexibilities
that have been built into the international intellectual property re-
gime,” which developed over many years of compromise.77
Third, the ISDS creates the potential for parties to arbitrate intel-
lectual property disputes behind closed doors in secret proceedings,
which attract less public attention. Contrasted against the Chapter 17
intellectual property terms, which direct parties to litigate claims in
open court,78 these secret proceedings potentially grant terms to a
party that fall below the minimum intellectual property standards es-
tablished by the TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization.
For some critics, this outcome appears to contradict NAFTA’s
objectives.
In practice, some experts believe NAFTA has “acted as the catalyst
for an explosion of investment claims.”79 Over the last twenty-two
years, NAFTA has generated more than 50 ISDS claims.80 However,
the U.S. “has yet to be required to pay an award to a foreign claim-
ant.”81 Indeed, more than half of the claims filed, and in some cases
litigated, have occurred between the two more-developed nations of
NAFTA, the U.S. and Canada.82 This result is striking in light of Mex-
ico’s general lack of intellectual property standards prior to NAFTA,83
which could have led to more intellectual property and investment
claims after NAFTA came into force. However, the data indicates that
this assumption has yet to materialize.
Based on actual litigation arising under Chapter 11 investment pro-
visions, “the most significant and controversial investor’s protections”
include the right to national treatment; the right to fair and equitable
treatment; and the right to fair compensation in the event of expropri-
75. Yu, supra note 67, at 832.
76. Id. at 835.
77. Id.
78. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 17.
79. Todd Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principles of International Eco-
nomic Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35, 67 (2003).
80. Gantz, supra note 74, at 237.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Garcia, supra note 8, at 825.
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ation or nationalization.84 Additionally, the primary concerns sur-
rounding medical patents have surfaced “over the lack of
transparency” in secret, behind-closed-doors ISDS proceedings.85
These central claims highlight the potential for a lack of consistent
and predictable intellectual property enforcement in a time of emerg-
ing and expensive technological advancements in medicine.
2. The Shortcomings of Chapter 11 for Biologics
Unfortunately, the investment involved in the developing biologics
may face difficulty receiving protection under NAFTA. However, al-
though NAFTA grants conventional pharmaceutical drugs stronger
protection than biologics, the NAFTA investment chapter seems to
create difficulty for both conventional and newer forms of pharmaceu-
tical drugs.
In the previously mentioned Eli Lilly case, Eli Lilly utilized Chapter
11 of NAFTA to sue the Canadian government for invalidating the
patents of two of Ely Lilly’s primary drugs, Strattera and Zyprexa.86
Between 2005 and 2015, Canadian courts invalidated eighteen patents
for prescription drugs produced by several U.S. pharmaceutical com-
panies.87 Then the Canadian government invalidated two of Eli Lilly’s
patents under the “promise of the patent” doctrine of utility of the
Canadian Patent Act, which “seeks to ensure that firms do not obtain
a legal monopoly on the basis of speculative claims about increased
utility . . . that were unsubstantiated at the time of filing.”88 Although
Canadian courts previously interpreted this doctrine favorably for
U.S. pharmaceutical companies, when the Canadian court invalidated
Eli Lilly’s patents prior to their expiration, based on the grounds that
their utility was not shown, the pharmaceutical company sued Canada
under Chapter 11 ISDS provisions due to the company’s belief that
the court exercised a new and inconsistent interpretation of the Act.89
One key issue in the case was that Eli Lilly reasonably expected its
patents to be valid for the standard twenty-year period established by
years of global intellectual property doctrine.90 Despite this expecta-
tion, the Canadian courts retroactively invalidated Eli Lilly’s patents
potentially to support public policy and to prevent pharmaceutical
companies from trying “to evergreen prior patents by claiming that a
84. Gantz, supra note 74, at 238.
85. Id. at 239.
86. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of
Arbitration, ¶¶ 3, 4 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/
onlineawards/c3544/dc4612_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FQS-BQQQ].
87. Yu, supra note 67, at 834.
88. Jerome H. Reichman, Compliance of Canada’s Utility Doctrine with Interna-
tional Minimum Standards of Patent Protection, 108 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 313, 313
(2015).
89. Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 at ¶¶4–5.
90. Id. ¶ 5.
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small selection of a number of previously patented compounds pro-
vides a ‘substantial advantage’ that merits new patent protection.”91
The basis of Eli Lilly’s claims was that, under this promise doctrine,
Canadian courts invalidated the patents of successful pharmaceutical
companies, such as Eli Lilly, which was inconsistent with Canada’s ob-
ligations under NAFTA, the TRIPS Agreement, and other treaties.92
However, Eli Lilly was unsuccessful in using Chapter 11 as a second-
line attempt to protect its patents and its investments when its claims
under Chapter 17 of NAFTA failed.
Although Eli Lilly ultimately lost its NAFTA complaint,93 the suit
generated a great deal of discussion about the difference between in-
tellectual property in the trade regime and intellectual property in the
investment regime—particularly with respect to newer pharmaceutical
products like biologics. If the producers of conventional pharmaceuti-
cal drugs cannot successfully utilize Chapter 11 to protect their invest-
ments against intellectual property violations by the NAFTA
signatories, it is unlikely that more advanced pharmaceuticals, such as
biologics, will enjoy a better outcome.
A key issue with this likely outcome under the original NAFTA is
that the investment in conventional pharmaceuticals and biologics is
continuing to grow in the global market and particularly in the U.S.
despite the inadequate Chapter 11 protections. While it is important
that investment in conventional pharmaceutical drugs, like those pro-
duced by Eli Lilly, is reasonably protected under NAFTA, it may be-
come an increasingly contentious issue as investment in biologics
becomes the largest share of growth in the pharmaceutical industry.94
Thus, while a new NAFTA should contain updated intellectual prop-
erty provisions, it is also imperative that the Agreement’s investment
chapters be updated, affording intellectual property holders an oppor-
tunity to challenge foreign governments and protect their already ro-
bust and continuously growing investments in biologics.
IV. PROPOSAL: USING THE TPP AS A MODEL FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY BUT NOT FOR INVESTMENT
When evaluating the future of NAFTA and its potential revisions,
many experts look to the language of the TPP Agreement as a guide.95
The TPP Agreement was signed in 2016 under U.S. President Barack
91. Reichman, supra note 88, at 313.
92. Yu, supra note 67, at 834.
93. Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 at ¶480.
94. World Preview 2017, Outlook to 2022, EVALUATEPHARMA (June, 2017), http://
info.evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/WP17.pdf [https://perma.cc/62PW-
Q43R].
95. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-
full-text [https://perma.cc/J7N6-RQ46] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
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Obama.96 Originally including twelve diverse countries, the TPP
Agreement attempted to resolve key issues that arose under previous
free-trade agreements.97 In addition to updating traditional ap-
proaches to issues covered by previous free trade agreements like
NAFTA, the TPP Agreement incorporates new and emerging trade
issues, including those related to intellectual property and invest-
ment.98 Of particular importance to biologics and other forms of per-
sonalized medicine, while the TPP Agreement’s intellectual property
provisions fix the previously described issues with patent rights under
the original NAFTA, the TPP Agreement’s investment provisions
should likely be scrutinized more heavily.
A. Fixing NAFTA
1. Chapter 17 Patent and Data Exclusivity Provisions
The TPP Agreement offers a model for new advances in intellectual
property protections that the NAFTA renegotiations should consider,
including those related to biologics and personalized medicine. Of
special importance for these new forms of pharmaceuticals, the initial
TPP Agreement proposals required participating signatories to either
increase their individual, mismatched data exclusivity provisions for
biologic drugs to match the U.S. standard of twelve years; or to actu-
ally create data exclusivity standards where none had previously ex-
isted.99 This advancement surprised many experts, as the proposal was
different from the expected changes to free trade agreements under
the Obama Administration. However, this significant change repre-
sents an attempt by the TPP Agreement’s drafters to standardize the
period of data exclusivity to which biologics drug makers are entitled
“as a way of recouping the high costs of discovering and proving effec-
tiveness of biologic therapeutics.”100
2. Chapter 11 Investment Provisions
When President Obama entered the U.S. into the TPP Agreement
in 2016,101 over two decades after NAFTA was signed, the TPP
Agreement’s investment provisions were the latest in the evolution of
96. Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REP.
(Oct. 04, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/
2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/M3WR-RV66]
[hereinafter OFF. U.S. TRADE REP. 4].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 32.
100. Fuller, supra note 39.
101. Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF.
PRESS SECRETARY, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/03/
statement-president-signing-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/8EF5-GXUZ]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
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investor protection.102 Among its various changes, section 1(c) of the
TPP Agreement continued to evolve the definition of the NAFTA
Chapter 11 term “customary international obligation” as “resulting
from”103 a “general and consistent practice of States that they follow
from a sense of legal obligation,” which is consistent with current free-
trade agreement practices and resolved many confusing definitions in
NAFTA.104 Importantly, several TPP Agreement provisions also
changed the investment landscape in previous free trade agreements
like  NAFTA, as well as their relationship to intellectual property
rights. However, the earlier NAFTA’s investment provisions are per-
haps more useful for U.S. pharmaceutical companies than the newer
TPP provisions, particularly with respect to biologics and new forms
of personalized medicine.
Two primary significant changes were made to investment provi-
sions under the TPP Agreement. First, the TPP Agreement requires
“transparency” with respect to the arbitral tribunals in its Chapter 9
provisions.105 Under the TPP Agreement, “arbitral proceedings will
remain open and publicly accessible.”106 Under Article 9.24.1, the
TPP Agreement “requires the respondent to make publicly available”
several important documents,107 including “notice of intent;” “notice
of arbitration;” and “orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal.”108
According to experts in trade and investment, “such transparency will
ensure high-quality decision making while promoting democratic val-
ues, public participation, accountability, and legitimacy,”109 all of
which were concerns voiced about the Eli Lilly arbitration with
Canada.
Importantly, the TPP Agreement also establishes a code of conduct
for arbitrators using the ISDS to ensure “independence and impartial-
ity”110 under Article 28.10(d),111 which was a voiced concern of the
pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly.112 Additionally, Article 28.17.7
specifically grants disputing parties the opportunity to “submit written
comments to the panel on its initial report,”113 opening the dialogue
between the discontent party and the host state.
Second, the TPP Agreement supposedly improves the tunnel-vision
of the arbitrators using the ISDS under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, as well
102. Gantz, supra note 80, at 259.
103. Id. at 254.
104. OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 95, at Annex 9-A.
105. Gantz, supra note 80, at 254.
106. Yu, supra note 67, at 870.
107. Id.
108. OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 95, art. 9.24.1.
109. Yu, supra note 67, at 871.
110. Id.
111. OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 95, art. 28.2.10.
112. Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2.
113. OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 95, art. 28.17.7.
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as “their over-emphasis [on] intellectual property rights as investor’s
rights.”114 Specifically, Article 9.23.3 of the TPP Agreement states
that “the tribunal may accept and consider written amicus curiae sub-
missions” from non-disputing parties that may have an interest in the
proceedings “regarding a matter of fact or law within the scope of the
dispute that may assist the tribunal.”115 This provision allows stake-
holders outside of the dispute to provide insight about the proceed-
ings that allow the tribunal to consider non-intellectual property
related issues that could be affected by the outcome of the proceed-
ings. Additionally, under Article 28.14,116 the TPP Agreement allows
the “investor’s home states” to “make submissions to arbitral tribu-
nals,”117 furthering the stakeholder’s input in the process.
Despite the TPP Agreements’ advancements, a few experts believe
that the investment provisions, including the ISDS, under the original
NAFTA have been overly criticized. These experts contend that the
older provisions are not as in need of update as some critics suggest.
After all, despite the pervasive notion that arbitration through the
ISDS lacks transparency and gives arbitrators tunnel vision, Eli Lilly
still lost its claim under Chapter 11.
The experts in favor of keeping the investment arbitration system
under the original NAFTA posit that criticism of NAFTA’s current
ISDS provisions focuses too intently on a perceived lack of trans-
parency, unpredictability, incoherence, and unfair bias toward indus-
try.118 Specifically, experts in favor of the original NAFTA provisions
disagree that investment treaties and investment-treaty arbitration
“institutionalize a pro-investor bias that casts the legitimacy of the en-
tire system of international investment law and arbitration into
doubt.”119 These experts argue that, “while aspects of the system
should be critically observed and evaluated,” the overall system de-
sign as such “faces fewer fundamental concerns than critical voices
purport.”120 In particular, these experts look to the current system’s
ability to stabilize and enable “economic exchange in the investment
context,”121 as well as the fact that the current ISDS actually contains
several checks and balances against unfair bias towards industry, in-
cluding a host-state’s ability to appoint arbitrators122 and the informal
control mechanism of public scrutiny through instantaneous online ac-
114. Yu, supra note 69, at 870–871.
115. OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 95, art. 9.23.3.
116. Id. art. 28.14.
117. Yu, supra note 69, at 873.
118. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat of a Boon to
the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 427, 474-75 (2009).
119. Id. at 474–75.
120. Id. at 477.
121. Id. at 497.
122. Id. at 491.
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cess.123  All told, advocates of the ISDS under the original NAFTA
believe that arbitration has long served as “an accepted system of dis-
pute resolution in public international law” and has been tested over
time.124 Thus, instead of focusing on the perceived bias in the system,
some experts advocate that “critics should look to the outcomes of
proceedings in order to evaluate the legitimacy of protection and the
capacity to live up to the standards of independence, impartiality, and
judicial judgment.”125
This observation is particularly important in light of the outcome of
several cases, including Eli Lilly, that show how well the current sys-
tem works despite the perception that arbitration proceedings favor
the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, in light of these outcomes, the
ISDS in the original NAFTA is likely equipped with enough checks
and balances to be a viable mechanism for international investor dis-
putes against the governments of the NAFTA signatories. Thus, de-
spite popular opinion that the ISDS is in desperate need of revision,
the results indicate that the system is fine in its current form under the
original NAFTA. Therefore, newer developments under the TPP
Agreement should not be weighed as heavily in the renegotiation of
the Chapter 11 investment provisions under a new and improved
NAFTA.
V. CONCLUSION
President Donald Trump’s May 2017 announcement that NAFTA
will be renegotiated has reenergized the treatment of intellectual
property-based investments under the respective chapters of the origi-
nal NAFTA. This discussion has been historically controversial be-
cause there are two vastly different opinions on the issue of
intellectual property rights protections in a global economy. On the
one hand, countries like the U.S tend to believe that pharmaceutical
patents are essential to their technology-driven economies. These
countries often focus on a theory of patent law that awards innovation
and minimizes free-riding, thereby enabling inventors to develop new
products in the face of high costs. On the other hand, other coun-
tries—particularly developing countries—believe that pharmaceutical
patents are an expensive barrier to economic development, as these
developing countries are more likely to pay royalties than receive
them. However, without effective patent protection, pharmaceutical
companies in the U.S. face the possibility of piracy and premature ge-
neric competition. Both pose a problem for the producers of conven-
tional pharmaceutical drugs that invest large sums of money into the
research and development of new drugs.
123. Id. at 492.
124. Brower & Schill, supra note 118, at 493.
125. Id. at 497.
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This disagreement has been exasperated by new developments in
medical technology, including the introduction of biologics and per-
sonalized medicine in the pharmaceutical drugs market. As was previ-
ously mentioned, without effective patent protection for these new
forms of pharmaceutical drugs, pharmaceutical companies will strug-
gle when generic manufacturers begin producing new forms of bi-
osimilars at a greatly reduced price. Although the producers of
conventional pharmaceutical drugs have encountered this problem in
the past, the introduction of biosimilar drugs will pose an even greater
threat to biologics than generic drugs have previously posed for con-
ventional pharmaceutical drugs, as the cost of producing biologics is
significantly greater than the cost of producing conventional pharma-
ceutical drugs. These increased costs will put a strain on biologics pro-
ducers, as they attempt to recoup their hefty investments in this new
form of medicine. Unfortunately, under the original NAFTA’s intel-
lectual property and investment provisions, biologics producers are
not sufficiently armed to combat these significant losses in new medi-
cal technology.
Although the Trump Administration announced its decision to
withdraw from the TPP Agreement on January 23, 2017,126 the inno-
vations of the Agreement are likely to remain— particularly with re-
spect to the TPP Agreement’s intellectual property advancements,
including those related to extending data exclusivity.127 This is illus-
trated by the fact that the investment chapter of the TPP has been
incorporated by reference into international agreements, such as the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership.
The TPP Agreement provisions related to intellectual property re-
present a substantial improvement to the older provisions of the origi-
nal NAFTA that will likely increase patent protections for biologics
and personalized medicine rights holders. Thus, the TPP protections
offer a strong first-line defense of protection for patent-rights holders,
and a new version of NAFTA should adopt them. However, criticism
of the old NAFTA Chapter 11 investment provisions may be over-
stated, as the original investment provisions likely provide a good sec-
ond-line defense for patent-rights holders, as they strengthen
transparency, which is ultimately good for business.
126. Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Negotiations and Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REP., https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-
trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/2J3B-5VPW] (last
visited Jan. 12, 2018).
127. See Gantz, supra note 80, at 259.
